An elementary presentation is given of classical and relativistic collision dynamics based upon the principle of conservation of momentum. The concepts of mass are shown to be implicitly defined and their basic properties are rigorously derived and discussed. Luxons and tachyons are treated on the same footing as material particles.

We develop a process-based framework, articulating the escalation of difference between “private” self and “public” display as an alternative trajectory in the pursuit of authenticity to alignment and compromise. A parsimonious model presents an endogenous dynamic of binary choice that generates momentum toward polarization. The model is illustrated in the context of “black” metal – a branch of heavy metal music that appeared in Norway in the early 1990s, notorious for its involvement in criminal activities. Using fanzine data, we construct (...) a narrative of how a process of escalation led to innovation and transgression through self-selection and exclusion. The analysis addresses two related theoretical problems – what motivates actors to challenge normative scripts and “burn the bridges” to social acceptance, and why such challenges may prove more effective in achieving recognition than compromise. Examples from politics, culture and sports reinforce the importance of these problems. (shrink)

Dans sa lecture de l'Hommage de Lacan à Marguerite Duras pour Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, Erik Porge met en évidence, cinquante ans après, l'actualité de ce texte où Lacan lie la problématique de la sublimation à celle d'une fiction clinique faisant cas. Il montre en effet que la transmission de la clinique de l'analyste participe de la dynamique de la sublimation de celui-ci. La topologie du fantasme, avec laquelle cette folie féminine - qui s'inscrit dans la suite (...) de Marguerite Anzieu (cas Aimée) et des soeurs Papin - est abordée, ouvre le lecteur à une dynamique transférentielle et de sublimation par son articulation à la pulsion. En même temps que Lacan parle de la sublimation, il est ravi par le texte et fait acte de sublimation dans l'écriture de son Hommage, en nouant l'objet de sa propre pulsion au Ravissement de Lol V. Stein et à Marguerite Duras elle-même. Dans un mouvement de retour sur sa lecture de ce texte, Lacan élève la lettre à la dignité de la Chose (définition de la sublimation) ; le style devient condition d'accès au cas et fait lui-même cas. (shrink)

Six palimpsest folios – or, to be accurate, three bifolios – of the Verona manuscript, Biblioteca Capitolare XL, contain fragments of a Latin translation of Euclid's Elements: fols. 331v–r and 326v–r, 341r–v and 338r–v, 336r–v and 343r–v. The folios are dated to around a.d. 500, and the text is written in capital script in two columns. Unfortunately the folios have suffered severe damage from various chemical substances, which were used by nineteenth-century scholars in attempts to retrieve the underlying text. Nevertheless, (...) an edition of the fragments finally appeared in 1964 by M. Geymonat. (shrink)

We model the optimal copulation duration in the yellow dungflyScathophaga stercoraria, assuming that males optimize their reproductive success per day. The independent state-variables of a male are the actual sperm reserves, the female encounterrate and the time of the day. We used stochastic dynamic programming to predict the optimal copulation duration. The model predicts that copulation duration should increase (i) for larger males, (ii) for males with a better previous diet (iii) for males accepting more females (iv) for males staying (...) away from the dung during a whole day. It also predicts that (v) males on a restricted diet should accept fewer matings, (vi) testes size should shrivel during the day, (vii) the correlation coefficient between copulation duration and sequence number should decrease with increasing initial sperm reserve and with increasing number of copulations performed on a given day.There are two essential differences between our model and a model of Parker (1992). (i) Our model assumes that males optimize per day. Parker's model assumes that males optimize per mating bout, one bout comprising many days. (ii) Since all the important state variables depend only on the moment of the copulation, our model does not assume a long-time memory in dungflies, and it is more flexible than Parker's model. Overall, both models explain the data available equally well. (shrink)

"For at kunne leve og virke og for at kunne planlægge vort eget liv på længere sigt, må vi tage stilling til livets tre hovedproblemer: Hvad kan vi vide? Hvad tør vi håbe? Og hvad skal vi gøre? Det er netop disse problemer, de store filosoffer har tænkt igennem langt mere dybtgående og grundigt, end man sædvanligvis har mulighed for at gøre det." I en vis forstand er vi alle sammen filosoffer, for vi har alle et bestemt livssyn, om vi (...) er klar over det eller ej. Professor i filosofi Svend Erik Stybes bog beskriver ikke blot forskellige livssyn, som er opstået gennem filosofihistorien i løbet af de sidste mange århundreder. Han giver også en definition af begrebet livssyn, som de fleste vil kunne relatere til og få til at give mening i forhold til deres eget liv. Bogen "De store tænkere og vort livssyn" fra 1963 henvender sig til enhver, der har interesse for livets store og små spørgsmål og forskellige filosoffer og idéhistorikeres tilgang dertil. Svend Erik Stybe (1919-1995) var en dansk idéhistoriker og forfatter, der udgav et væld af bøger om både dansk og europæisk filosofi- og idéhistorie gennem de sidste mange hundrede år. Han skrev blandt andet bøger til brug i undervisning i idéhistorie på gymnasiet og universitetet, opslagsværker om filosofi og idéhistorie samt bøger om specifikke filosoffer som Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke og Baruch de Spinoza. Svend Erik Stybe blev udnævnt til professor i filosofi ved Københavns Universitet i 1970, hvor han forblev frem til sin pension i 1989. (shrink)

As an extension of the well-known Action Description Language A introduced by M. Gelfond and V. Lifschitz [8] C. Baral and M. Gelfond recently defined the diafect AC which supports the description of concurrent actions [1]. Also, a sound but incomplete encoding of AC by means of an extended logic program was presented there. In this paper, we work on interpretations of contradictory inferences from partial action descriptions. Employing an interpretation different from the one implicitly used in AC, we present (...) a new dialect which allows to infer sound information from contradictory descriptions and to describe non-determinism and uncertainty. Furthermore, we give the first sound and complete encoding of AC, using equational logic programming, and extend it to as well. (shrink)

It is gratifying to see that philosophers' continued interest in Words and Objections has been so strong as to motivate a paperback edition. This is gratifying because it vindicates the editors' belief in the permanent im portance of Quine's philosophy and in the value of the papers com menting on it which were collected in our volume. Apart from a couple of small corrections, only one change has been made. The list of Professor Quine's writings has been brought up to (...) date. The editors cannot claim any credit for this improvement, however. We have not tried to imitate the Library of Living Philosophers volumes and to include Professor Quine's autobiography in this volume, but we are fortunate to publish here his brand-new auto bibliography. 1975 THE EDITORS TABLE OF CONTENTS V PREFACE 1 EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION 1. 1. C. SMAR T / Quine's Philosophy of Science 3 GILBERT HARMAN / An Introduction to 'Translation and Meaning', Chapter Two of Word and Object 14 ERIK STENIUS / Beginning with Ordinary Things 27 NOAM CHOMSKY / Quine's Empirical Assumptions 53 1AAKKO HINTIKKA / Behavioral Criteria of Radical Translation 69 BARRY STROUD / Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation 82 P. F. STRA WSON / Singular Terms and Predication 97 118 H. P. GRICE / Vacuous Names P. T. (shrink)

It is gratifying to see that philosophers' continued interest in Words and Objections has been so strong as to motivate a paperback edition. This is gratifying because it vindicates the editors' belief in the permanent im portance of Quine's philosophy and in the value of the papers com menting on it which were collected in our volume. Apart from a couple of small corrections, only one change has been made. The list of Professor Quine's writings has been brought up to (...) date. The editors cannot claim any credit for this improvement, however. We have not tried to imitate the Library of Living Philosophers volumes and to include Professor Quine's autobiography in this volume, but we are fortunate to publish here his brand-new auto bibliography. 1975 THE EDITORS TABLE OF CONTENTS V PREFACE 1 EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION 1. 1. C. SMAR T / Quine's Philosophy of Science 3 GILBERT HARMAN / An Introduction to 'Translation and Meaning', Chapter Two of Word and Object 14 ERIK STENIUS / Beginning with Ordinary Things 27 NOAM CHOMSKY / Quine's Empirical Assumptions 53 1AAKKO HINTIKKA / Behavioral Criteria of Radical Translation 69 BARRY STROUD / Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation 82 P. F. STRA WSON / Singular Terms and Predication 97 118 H. P. GRICE / Vacuous Names P. T. (shrink)

Evolutionary debunkers of morality hold this thesis: If S’s moral belief that P can be given an evolutionary explanation, then S’s moral belief that P is not knowledge. In this paper, I debunk a variety of arguments for this thesis. I first sketch a possible evolutionary explanation for some human moral beliefs. Next, I explain how, given a reliabilist approach to warrant, my account implies that humans possess moral knowledge. Finally, I examine the debunking arguments of Michael Ruse, Sharon Street, (...) and Richard Joyce. I draw on the account of moral knowledge sketched earlier to illustrate how these arguments fail. -/- . (shrink)

Seite dualität: Anarchismus 121. Konsequenzen der individualitätszerstörenden Gleichheitstheorie: Stellung der Frau 123; unhistorische Denkweise 123; ...

Stuart White argues that egalitarians need a diverse toolkit of policy proposals in order to move closer to a just economic system. In particular he argues that a policy of Basic Capital grants should be included in this toolkit along with a variety of other more familiar instruments such as unconditional Basic Income, welfare state services and income supports, and support for worker cooperatives. The various policies in the egalitarian toolkit, however, have implications for issues other than contributing to a (...) more just economic system. In particular, they have implications for the long term stability, transformation, or even transcendence, of capitalism as an economic system. In this article I will argue that unconditional Basic Income has a greater potential to erode capitalism than does Basic Capital. While both of these policies in the egalitarian toolkit may make the economic system statically more just, over time Basic Capital grants are likely to strengthen capitalism as the core structure of the economic system, whereas unconditional Basic Income has the potential to erode the dominance of capitalism. As part of a long-term project of human emancipation, therefore, unconditional Basic Income should have priority over Basic Capital. (shrink)

Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it is false that x (...) is worse than y with respect to V and (iii) it is false that x and y are equally good with respect to V . Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently, however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is explained in terms of vagueness or indeterminacy . In this paper I aim to further Broome’s view in two ways. Firstly, I want to supply independent reasons for thinking that the phenomenon of value incomparability is indeed a matter of the indeterminacy inherent in our comparative predicates. Secondly, I attempt to defend Broome’s account by warding off several objections that worry him, due mainly to Erik Carlson and Ruth Chang. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive account of what it means to try to quantify health in distributing resources for health care. It examines the concept of QALYs which supposedly makes it more accurate to talk about life in terms of both quality and quantity of years lived when referring to health care policy. It offers an elegant new approach to comparing the costs and benefits of medical interventions. Cost-Utility Analysis is a method designed by economists to aid decision makers distribute (...) scarce resources to areas of health care where they will yield the greatest benefits. Erik Nord questions the feasibility of measuring patients' quality of life meaningfully in numerical terms, as CUA presupposes. He presents an alternative approach called cost-value analysis in which representative samples of the general public express preferences between different health-care programs. In this approach, subjects are allowed to include concerns for fairness that go beyond concerns for efficiency of conventional health economics. (shrink)

Daniel M. Hausman holds that preferences in economics are total subjective comparative evaluations—subjective judgments to the effect that something is better than something else all things told—and that economists are right to employ this conception of preference. Here, I argue against both parts of Hausman’s thesis. The failure of Hausman’s account, I continue, reflects a deeper problem, that is, that preferences in economics do not need an explicit definition of the kind that he seeks. Nonetheless, Hausman’s labors were not in (...) vain: his accomplishment is that he has articulated a useful model of the theory. (shrink)

In a seminal book, Alvin I. Goldman outlines a theory for how to evaluate social practices with respect to their “veritistic value”, i.e., their tendency to promote the acquisition of true beliefs in society. In the same work, Goldman raises a number of serious worries for his account. Two of them concern the possibility of determining the veritistic value of a practice in a concrete case because we often don't know what beliefs are actually true, and even if we did, (...) the task of determining the veritistic value would be computationally extremely difficult. Neither problem is specific to Goldman's theory and both can be expected to arise for just about any account of veritistic value. It is argued here that the first problem does not pose a serious threat to large classes of interesting practices. The bulk of the paper is devoted to the computational problem, which, it is submitted, can be addressed in promising terms by means of computer simulation. In an attempt to add vividness to this proposal, an up-and-running simulation environment is presented and put to some preliminary tests. (shrink)

When scientist investigate why things happen, they aim at giving an explanation. But what does a scientific explanation look like? In the first chapter (Theories of Scientific Explanation) of this book, the milestones in the debate on how to characterize scientific explanations are exposed. The second chapter (How to Study Scientific Explanation?) scrutinizes the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation, Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon and shows what went wrong. Next, it is the responsibility of current philosophers (...) of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the pragmatic approach to scientific explanation and clarify briefly what this approach consists in. The third chapter (A Toolbox for Describing and Evaluating Explanatory Practices) elaborates the pragmatic approach by presenting a toolbox for analysing scientific explanation. In the last chapter (Examples of Descriptions and Evaluations of Explanatory Practices) the approach is illustrated with real-life examples of scientists aiming at explaining. (shrink)

The ongoing ‘enhancement’ debate pits critics of new self-shaping technologies against enthusiasts. One important thread of that debate concerns medicalization, the process whereby ‘non-medical’ problems become framed as ‘medical’ problems.In this paper I consider the charge of medicalization, which critics often level at new forms of technological self-shaping, and explain how that charge can illuminate – and obfuscate. Then, more briefly, I examine the charge of pharmacological Calvinism, which enthusiasts, in their support of technological self-shaping, often level at critics. And (...) I suggest how that charge, too, can illuminate and obfuscate.Exploring the broad charge of medicalization and the narrower counter charge of pharmacological Calvinism leads me to conclude that, as satisfying as it can be to level one of those charges at our intellectual opponents, and as tempting as it is to lie down and rest with our favorite insight, we need to gather the energy to have a conversation about the difference between good and bad forms of medicalization. Specifically, I suggest that if we consider the ‘medicalization of love,’ we can see why critics of and enthusiasts about technological self-shaping should want (and in some cases have already begun) to distinguish between good and bad forms of such medicalization. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I present a line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism about divine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popular sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil. Thus, I seek to impale sceptical theists on the horns of a dilemma: concede that either (a) sceptical theism implies scepticism about divine assertions, or (b) the sceptical theistic strategy (...) for responding to evidential arguments from evil fails. An implication of (a) is that sceptical theism is at odds with any religious tradition according to which there are certain claims that we can know to be true solely in virtue of the fact that God has told us that they are true. This result will render conceding (a) unattractive to many sceptical theists. (shrink)